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Abstract Corruption is notoriously persistent in Nigeria notwithstanding the panoply
of laws deployed over the years against it. This article argues that the factors
constraining the effectiveness of laws in the fight against corruption are to be found
not in the laws, but in the larger societal matrix of resilient social norms and institutions,
which constitute the environment of corruption in the country. The environment thus
constituted is either conducive to, or largely tolerant of, corruption. The article then
suggests that the anti-corruption effort, to be successful, must engage broadly with the
environment by instigating social change.
Introduction
This article will examine the role of social norms and the law in the anti-corruption
struggle of Nigeria in recent times. Studies of Nigeria’s engagement with corruption
manifest a consensus on, at least, two things: (a) that corruption is widespread and
banalized [1–4], making the phenomenon the greatest obstacle to development [5], and
(b) that corruption is resilient and persistent [6–9], making the effort to combat it appear
ineffective. Nigerians often conclude that, given their abundance of natural endow-
ments, the massive scale of poverty among the bulk of their population cannot be
explained but by the ravages of corruption. They also accept that combating corruption
is bound to be a daunting, perhaps insuperable, challenge given its entrenchment. They
speak of corruption Bfighting back^, and of corruption having Beaten deep into the
fabric^ of their country [10, 11].
The following questions are central to this inquiry: what is the environment of
corruption in Nigeria? What counts as corruption in the value acceptances of
Nigerians? Why is corruption so resilient and persistent in Nigeria? Why have laws
been rather ineffective to combat corruption in Nigeria? Is there a dissonance between
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laws and social norms? If so, how has this dissonance played out in the fight against
corruption in Nigeria? Finally, are there any prospects for the eradication or, at least, a
reduction of corruption in Nigeria?
Norms, law and social change: The conceptual linkage
Norms are a very important factor for consideration in any attempt to change social
behavior. They embody the standards of appropriate behavior in any community. A
norm has been defined as a pattern of behavior which people conform to on condition
that they believe that most people in their reference network conform to it [12]. The
defining characteristic of a norm is social expectation [13–15]. Social norms dictate the
extent to which individuals engage, and expect others to engage in corruption. There-
fore, norms clearly constitute the social environment of corruption. There are many
ways of changing norms ([16, 17];), but slegislative intervention appears to be the most
preferred among the countries of the developing world, where, not surprisingly, the
pressure for change from old institutions considered to be obstructive of rapid devel-
opment can be quite overwhelming.
Law can be an effective tool of social change because legal intervention can
coordinate social behavior by creating new expectations [12, 18]. A new law can
change behavior, for example, by changing the rules that govern certain activities.
Rules governing traffic, to use Bicchieri’s example, can easily achieve the desired
purpose because drivers and other road users expect that everyone would obey the rules
as it is in their best interest to do so. In the case of social norms, however, the success
rate of legislative intervention is very low because of law’s essential contingency.
Success quite often depends on such factors as Blegitimacy, procedural fairness, and
how the law is originated and enforced^. Studies have borne out the following pre-
requisites: (a) whether the law originated from a legitimate and recognized authority;
(b) whether the law was imposed from the top down, without an opportunity for
citizens’ views to be heard and considered by the authorities; (c) whether citizens have
trust in formal institutions, such as the legal system and the rule of law; (d) whether the
dissonance between the legal arrangements and social norms is not so great as to
deprive the law of credibility [19–21].
Concerning social norms and the effectiveness of law, it has been argued that Bif the
law strays too far from the norms, the public will not respect the law, and hence will not
stigmatize those who violate it. Loss of stigma means loss of the most important
deterrent the criminal justice system has. If the law is to have any value at all, it needs
to stick close to the norms.^ ([22], p. 1872). Examples of successful legal interventions
based on law’s closeness to popular views abound. Similarly, there are also well-
documented examples of failure of legal interventions to change attitudes and behavior
because they adopted aggressive tactics without due consideration to the great distance
between the new law and the social norms. By contrast, however, less aggressive
tactics, which allowed the society to be Bnudged^ towards change rather than Bharshly
shoved^, have recorded more success [23, 24].
All of this establishes that the legal approach to social change is contingent on
several factors which merit careful consideration in a democratic setting. These factors
may not be relevant in a dictatorship, which explains the great failure of most
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corruption clean-ups in the many authoritarian regimes that once dominated the
continents of Africa, Asia, and Latin America [8].
Setting the context: History of Nigeria’s anti-corruption struggle
The history of corruption and the fight against it in Nigeria has a long pedigree. It dates
back to the establishment of the rudiments of modern public administration in the
country by the British colonial authorities. For convenience, this account will be
divided into two: (a) the period after independence from colonial rule (1960–1979)
and (b) the period of 1999–2017. The first period of democratic government beginning
from 1960 was terminated by a military coup d’etat in January 1966, followed by a
counter-coup, a civil war, and a military interregnum that lasted until 1979 (followed by
another interregnum from 1983 to 1999). The second refers to a period of successive
civilian governments beginning from 1999 to the present.
The immediate post-independence period (1960–1979)
After independence, the theme of corruption, which had begun from the colonial period
(1914–1960), continued to dominate the general perception of government activities and
public officials, both at the federal and regional levels. The federal minister for finance,
Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, was once describe as a Bbyword for luxury and ministerial
corruption^ [25, 26]. To charges of corruption, he was said to have responded by quoting
the biblical passage: BTo those that have, more shall be given; from those that do not have
shall be taken even the little that they have^. Another minister, Chief K. O. Mbadiwe,
when asked to explain the source of funds with which he had built a palatial home for
himself, famously stated that the funds were Bfrom sources known and unknown^.1 It is
noteworthy that one of the reasons given by the masterminds of the first military putsch in
1966 was widespread corruption. The leader of the coup, Major Patrick Kaduna
Nzeogwu, justified the coup thus: BOur enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers,
the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent; those that seek to
keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or
VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing
before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian
political calendar back by their words and deeds.^ [27]. The coup, and the counter-coup
which followed, instigated a downward spiral in the political fortunes of the country,
resulting in a civil war from 1967 to 1970 ([28]; de [29]).
After the civil war, the country, under the military government of General Yakubu
Gowon, experienced a windfall with the sudden upward swing of international oil
prices from 1973. Enormous amounts of revenue flowed into government coffers from
the spike in oil prices, almost overwhelming the management capacity of the govern-
ment. However, most of the revenue was stolen by public officials, while the govern-
ment dissipated the remainder on cultural jamborees, sports fiestas, and white-elephant
projects ([30], pp. 112–120). In the end, the government was toppled by another coup
d’état, in which General Murtala Muhammed became head of state. The new head of
1 There are various versions of these quotations, the sources of which appear hazy.
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state also blamed corruption, among other ills of leadership and society, for his
intervention. He quickly embarked on a corruption cleanup, dismissing hundreds of
civil servants and other public officials from work, and recovering thousands of dollars
from those proven to have illegally accumulated unexplained wealth from their offices.
He also tried to reorientate the value acceptances of the populace towards personal
discipline, accountability, and probity. In this, he was less successful. He was killed in
an abortive coup on February 13, 1976, less than a year into office.
In 1979, the military yielded to a civilian democratically elected government, led by
President Shehu Shagari. Under the civilian regime, there was a resurgence of corruption
so massive that the government was terminated after four years by another coup, led by
General Muhammadu Buhari, who himself was pushed out in 1985 by General Ibrahim
Babangida [31]. While the former’s style was stern and uncompromising on corruption,
he was head of state for less than two years, the latter was indifferent and is generally
believed to have allowed corruption to fester and become tacitly acceptable in govern-
ment. There were many corruption scandals under Babangida’s regime ([32], p. 94).
Babangida gutted the civil service by fundamentally altering its structure, thereby remov-
ing most of the institutional checks which were the bulwark of ethical behaviour among
civil servants. His were the days of ethical abandon, open theft and mismanagement of
public funds, and of great cynicism in state-society relationship among the populace. In
response to widespread criticism of his government, Babangida set up a committee on
corruption and economic crimes, to examine the causes and extent of corruption in both
the public and private sectors, to identify deficiencies in the existing legislation, and to
suggest improvements. The Corruption and Economic Crimes Decree 1990 was drafted
as a result of the committee’s work, but it was never promulgated before Babangida left
office in 1993. General Sani Abacha, a kleptomaniac, who, like his predecessor, stole
enormous amounts of money from just about any public source, including the Central
Bank of Nigeria, eased Babangida out of office. At the time of his death in 1998, Abacha
was reported to have stolen about $5 billion from Nigeria [33–36].
The period of successive democratic governments (1999–2017)
Following the death of Abacha, there was a transition to yet another civilian regime in
1999, the regime of former army general Olusegun Obasanjo. He had succeeded
Murtala Muhammed as head of state when the latter was assassinated in an abortive
coup in 1976. He then helped to install the civilian regime of Shehu Shagari in 1979. In
his second coming, he was a democratically elected president. Upon his inauguration,
corruption was one of the priority items of his agenda of governance. He did not only
speak against it at every opportunity, but he also acted severely against corruption.
Under his regime, two anti-corruption bodies were established: the Independent Cor-
rupt Practices and Other Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial
Offences Commission (EFCC), in addition to the existing Code of Conduct Tribunal
(CCT). He sought to recover all of the money and assets stashed away by Abacha
locally and abroad, but only with limited success. Of the alleged Abacha loot of billions
of dollars, he succeeded in recovering less than a billion dollars, owing in part to the
many hurdles inherent in transnational asset recovery. Yet, there were many allegations
of corruption against president Obasanjo and his ministers ([37], pp. 16–17; [38, 39]).
In 2007, at the end of his tenure, Obasanjo was succeeded by Umaru Musa Yar’Adua,
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from the same political party as himself, the Peoples Democratic Party. Yar’Adua died
in office in 2011, and his deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, succeeded him.
Goodluck Jonathan’s government is probably the most corrupt government ever to
take charge of affairs in Nigeria [40–42]. There were corruption scandals upon scandals
in which officials of his government and of his political party were implicated. These
include the oil subsidy scandal, the missing $20 billion dollars scandal, the bullet-proof
cars scandal of the Ministry of Aviation, the amnesty payments disbursement scandal,
to name but a few. The details of scandals involving defence spending, and theft of oil
money, are only now beginning to emerge. Compared to Obasanjo who took concrete
steps to control corruption, albeit with negligible success, Jonathan mainly paid lip
service to the issue of corruption in his government, occasionally seeming to even
defend it when he was not denying its existence [43]. When he contested election in
2015, one reason, among many failings of his government, why he was resoundingly
defeated by Muhammadu Buhari was the uncontrolled and growing incidence of
corruption in every sector of his government. Civil servants inflated their wage bill
by including the names of ghost workers on the payroll; ministers inflated their budgets
to allow non-existent expenditure items, the funds appropriated for which they then
promptly appropriated to themselves; contracts were diverted and abandoned but
money appropriated for them diverted to private pockets; huge sums of money were
unlawfully funneled into his political party as Bslush^ funds; the president spent untold
but unbudgeted or unappropriated funds [44]; military high-ranking officers and other
security officials stole the funds appropriated for security, with the consequence that the
security apparatus was so degraded it could not address a major security challenge
brought on by a terrorist group called BBoko Haram^; government lacked funds to pay
pensioners; there was massive infrastructural deficit which government could not
address owing to diversion of public funds to cronies, party hacks and relatives, for
non-essential but rent-yielding projects; state governors spent extravagant amounts of
money illegally on themselves and their families, on overseas travels, education of their
children and relatives, while not paying salaries and wages to workers and pensioners,
nor projects important to their citizens’ welfare; persons found guilty of corruption
were being pardoned and helped to reintegrate into the system; and the list is endless.
Arguably, some of these ills were a carry-over to Jonathan’s government, but corruption
stood out in Jonathan’s government against the background of unprecedented inflow of
oil revenues to the country. Between 2009 and 2014, oil prices averaged $90 - $103 per
barrel, and Nigeria sold 2.5 million barrels a day.
Muhammadu Buhari became the elected president of Nigeria in May 2015. The
reduction or elimination of corruption is part of his priority agenda. The other items are
security and the economy. He has moved very quickly to root out corruption from the
civil service by leveraging technology to institute new checks and balances in public
administration. He seems to be successfully engaging a combination of acknowledged
tools of change to fight against corruption. These are legislative interventions (several
new pieces of legislation have been passed by the legislature, albeit grudgingly – given
the terribly slow speed by which the legislature has attended to these pieces of
legislation – at the instance of the executive branch targeting corruption or toughening
existing laws against it) [45], media campaigns, economic incentives, and space for
democratic deliberation. Under this president, there have been more arrests and pros-
ecution of corrupt persons than in the previous periods put together. Hundreds of
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people are currently facing investigation and prosecution under hitherto hardly de-
ployed provisions of the laws, which essentially shift the burden of proof to the accused
person. Similarly, funds and other assets running into billions of dollars have been
subject of temporary seizure from persons accused of corruption pending conclusive
proof in court [46, 47]. Public servants have begun to feel the pressure of new checks
and balances [48]. Recently, the adoption of a whistleblower policy by the government
(yet to receive legislative backing) has spurred frenetic activity. Billions more of dollars
have been recovered from unexpected spaces which have been used by corrupt persons
to hide ill-gotten wealth – in underground bunkers, unoccupied apartment buildings
and homes, airport lounge, etc. [49–51]. Apparently, owners of illicit wealth have
resorted to hiding it in these spaces as toughened banking disclosure laws have made it
impossible to launder the money through the banks.
Although it has been public knowledge for decades that the judiciary was corrupt,
from the lowest to the highest court, judges had escaped scrutiny in the anti-corruption
fight. But, for the first time, the homes of several high-ranking judges were raided by
law enforcement officers and several judges were arrested and charged in 2016 [52].
Still, there is no total or uniform support for Buhari’s crusade against corruption.
Some have called it a vendetta against political opponents; others have called it a ruse,
while others have denied it of any chances of success. Most Nigerians only express
cautious optimism [53].
Corruption Bfights back^
Given the damage which corruption has brought on the Nigerian society on multiple
fronts [54], the natural assumption would be that citizens, at least a majority of them,
would support a credible fight against it. That is not the case. Socially, corruption has
divided the country and created a vast population of very poor citizens and a tiny elite of
the super rich. The public school system, for example, has all but been gutted, and a two-
tier education system now exists, with the children of the rich attending private schools,
which are comparable to the best institutions in the West, and the children of the poor
having no choice but the destroyed public education system. Politics has been rendered
so fractious and dangerous that most regard it as a game completely bereft of morality.
And, recently, the Nigerian economy slipped into a recession, with most Nigerians
blaming it on corruption. Global Financial Integrity, an international anti-corruption
watchdog, estimates that in the past decade over $157 billion have left Nigeria illicitly.
The fight against corruption in Nigeria is being fought within a strange mix of
circumstances. It is being resisted both by the corrupt elites and by the poor. The
former, who have hitherto enjoyed immunity from arrests, investigation, and prosecu-
tion, have sought to maintain the status quo. They have been aided in this by lawyers
who have thrown all sorts of legal impediments to the effort by the Buhari regime to
fight corruption. According to an influential commentator on the situation, Femi Falana
[55], himself a Senior Advocate of Nigeria:
A number of senior lawyers have obtained interim or perpetual injunctions from
judges certain politically exposed persons alleged to have engaged in criminal
diversion of public funds. In spite of the abolition of stay of proceedings or
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suspension of criminal trials by the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015,
senior lawyers and judges. . . have continued to subject corruption cases to
frivolous preliminary objections, (restraining) the police and anti-graft agencies
from arresting, investigating and prosecuting.
Falana, among other lawyers, has complained bitterly against his colleagues on the bar
and the bench who have seemingly made themselves available to be used to frustrate
the prosecution of corrupt elements in Nigeria. The Nigerian Bar Association has also
condemned this trend, although it has yet to take action against those members guilty of
the practice. The president has also verbalized his dissatisfaction at the level of judicial
engagement with the anti-corruption fight [56].
Politicians with vested interests have also stigmatized the anti-corruption fight as a
ruse and political vendetta against opponents. For example, the leading opposition
party, the Peoples Democratic Party, accuses the government of selective prosecution,
alleging that its members, who have been charged for corruption, were just being
persecuted by the All Progressives Congress government of Buhari [57–59]. Rather
confusingly, the president of the senate (Nigeria’s upper legislative body), who is a
leading member of the APC, has also alleged that his prosecution at the Code of
Conduct Tribunal (CCT) for false declaration of assets is politically motivated [60].
This narrative feeds the massively funded media campaign of Buhari’s traducers, who
aim to deny popular support to the anti-corruption campaign.
There is also a popular backlash against the anti-corruption campaign. Market
women, business people, labourers, artisans, transporters, and other segments of the
Nigerian population regularly express a longing for the corrupt days of previous
governments as against the government of Buhari and its singular focus on fighting
corruption. Moses Ochonu, who researched popular reaction to the fight, found that a
regular refrain among the masses of the people was Bbring back corruption^ [61]. Part
of the causes of the current economic recession in Nigeria was the massive theft and
diversion of funds to private pockets, draining the economy of much-needed life.
However, the Ochonu writes, B[I]n their desperation for respite, many Nigerians are
now paradoxically yearning for the corruption that they and their leaders blame for their
economic woes, but theirs is not a nostalgia for corruption per se but for a period in
which, despite or because of corruption, the flow of illicit government funds created a
sense of economic opportunity and prosperity .^
Indeed, the political and economic utility of corruption in Nigeria is well document-
ed. Students of the Nigerian state acknowledge the role of corruption in the constitution
and reconstitution of the state by political elites [2]. Corruption had been the fuel of the
Nigerian economy. Ochonu writes,
sustaining everything from major real estate transactions to the patronage econ-
omies of petty retailers. . . [C]orruption generates secondary and tertiary ripples
and transactional economies that benefit even the pepper seller in the market. . .
[W]hile corruption flourished in the previous administration of Goodluck Jona-
than, (the proceeds of) that corruption found (their) way in trickles to all the
consequential corners of the economy, lubricating the sinews of an economy that
depends, for good or ill, on the state’s revenue mobilisation, spending, and
leakage.
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Aside from the recession, the anti-corruption strategies of the Buhari government have
mopped up formerly Bstray^ funds and blocked the many loopholes and avenues for
theft by public officials, thereby blocking or substantially reducing the flow of illicit
funds through the economy. BBring back corruption^ might not necessarily have been a
preference for corruption among those interviewed, but it certainly indicated that in a
country immersed in corruption, few people cared about the sources of the money
which funded investments and projects from which they secured jobs and livelihoods.
Nevertheless, the corrupt elites often seize upon this rhetoric to instigate popular
discontent against the anti-corruption struggle.
Both the elites and certain segments of the citizenry have not hidden their expres-
sions of solidarity with persons arrested or being prosecuted for corruption. Visits to
detention centers of the EFCC by high political party officials who express sympathy
for the Bordeal^ of the accused persons [62, 63], and demonstrations by supporters of
accused persons alleging Bhigh-handedness^ of law enforcement personnel are some of
the ways that it has been sought to convey social antipathy to the anti-corruption fight.
In a few cases, powerful members of society, such as legislators, have attempted to
disrupt the trials of their colleagues accused of corruption [63]. In other cases, persons
who have served their penalties after being found guilty of corruption have been
welcomed home like heroes [64, 65].
There are also saboteurs of the anti-corruption fight from within Buhari’s govern-
ment. Several judges have been accused of taking bribes to pervert the law in favor of
persons accused of corrupt practices. Against loud objections by many lawyers and
other influential persons, some of these judges have been arrested and charged for
corruption recently, including judges of the highest court of the land, the Supreme
Court, and of the Federal Court of Appeal. However, the general perception is that this
is merely a tip of the iceberg, as a large segment of the judiciary is commonly known to
be corrupt [66, 67]. Some public officials have continued with the corrupt habit of
Bpadding^ the budget, such that several items of expenditure are replicated many times
in order to allow for embezzlement or misappropriation of the excess allocated funds.
Apparently, this a well-tested method of stealing by heads of ministries and agencies of
the government, but the recent attempt under the Buhari government led to severe
repercussions for the perpetrators who were caught through the president’s intelligence
apparatus [68–70].
Among the opponents to Buhari’s campaign against corruption are members of the
country’s two legislative houses – the House of Representatives (lower chamber) and
the Senate (upper chamber – usually referred to as the National Assembly). There have
been several corruption scandals involving high-ranking officials of the National
Assembly. One issue to which the National Assembly has shown great negative
sensitivity is the unabated call from the public upon members to disclose the details
of their remuneration just like other public officials. It is suspected that Nigerian
legislators are the highest paid legislators in the entire world bar none. Many believe
that this is theft of the public weal, especially as the popular assessment is that such
huge remuneration is not justified by the work that legislators do in Nigeria, held up
against what their counterparts do in other countries.
In response to the president’s determination to extend the anti-corruption fight to the
National Assembly, the legislators have threatened to leverage their powers of approval
and confirmation of the president’s nominees for office by refusing to approve or
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confirm these nominees regardless of their suitability for the positions. A recent
example is the refusal twice to confirm the president’s nominee for head of the premier
anti-corruption body, the EFCC, Ibrahim Magu [71–73]. It is generally suspected that
the opposition to Magu is motivated by the fear of his uncompromising stance against
the country’s thieving upper classes [74]. About 15 out of 109 senators either are under
investigation or are facing charges for serious corruption offences. Legislators had
called, for example, for the withdrawal of charges against the president of the senate,
Bukola Saraki, who faced several charges of corruption [75–77]. They have also used
their primary constitutional power (to make laws) to impede the president’s anti-
corruption campaign. Three vital legislative proposals from the presidency have
languished unattended in the legislature for at least one year.2
Several legislators, many of whom were state governors, have been accused of graft;
many of them have been charged [78]. More than once, legislators have attempted to pass
a law to confer legal immunity on themselves, but for the huge outcry against it by civil
society organizations [79, 80]. There is, however, a general admission by non-partisan
legislators that, under Buhari’s government, things are beginning to change [81].
Saraki was recently discharged and acquitted of all charges at the CCT. This
outcome, which deepened the cynicism of many Nigerians about the fight against
corruption, has been appealed by the authorities [82].
The environment of corruption in Nigeria: Norms and idioms of discourse
The problem of corruption in Nigeria has been diagnosed from a variety of perspec-
tives. Some blame poverty and greed, for example, for the desire among public officials
to steal public funds [83]. The salary of workers is abysmally low compared to the cost
of living. It is almost as if workers are expected to steal to augment their salaries, in a
country of extended families where an average worker is expected to cater to not only
the needs of his immediate family, but those of the extended family as well. Others have
blamed corruption on the lack of checks and balances or the failure of these in the
public service [84]. Yet others have explained corruption in terms of pseudo-modern-
ization, i.e. modernization that has failed to exclude informal structures and institutions
[31]. While all of these explanations fit into the more standard theories advanced by
many well-known writers on corruption as a social phenomenon ([85, 86]; they
sometimes fail to take account of the peculiarities of the Nigerian situation. After all,
poverty, greed, nepotism (which is associated with the development of the modern
public service), patrimonialism (the failure of modern institutions of government to
exclude informality), all existed historically in the various countries of the West, but
these have been made to yield progressively to greater transparency and accountability
as the countries made progress toward modern nationhood [87–89]. The real question,
then, is not why there is corruption in Nigeria, but why corruption has become
persistent in spite of effort to reduce or eradicate it. It is suggested, in the following,
that, fundamentally, the entrenchment of corruption in Nigeria is consistent with the
country’s failure to graduate from what was famously described as Ba mere
2 These are the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Whistleblowers Protection Act, and the Special Criminal
Courts Act.
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geographical expression^ [90] to modern nationhood. In short, Nigeria’s stubborn
corruption does arise from a particular history.
Most modern states emerged out of a moral consensus on the need for a state by the
populations that exist within them [91]. Such a consensus entailed the conscious
submerging of cultures, languages, and norms of behavior such that the state might
enjoy uniform standards of morality. In other words, public and private moralities
generally coincide. The Nigerian state, however, was not a product of such consensus;
rather it was imposed from the top by the British colonial authorities, without a
transcendental source of loyalty or basis for the exercise of state hegemony over the
multitude of primordial loyalties which existed before the imposition. The amalgam-
ation of the southern and northern protectorates to form Nigeria in 1914 was actuated,
not by a desire to form a nation, but for the administrative convenience of the British
colonial authority [92, 93]. Without a conscious effort to forge a consensus, various
social norms which are suggestive and emblematic of a lack of identity with national
interest have subsisted until today, entrenched by the failure of nation building.
The resulting normative context of corruption can be described as resistant, even
antagonistic, to the drive for anti-corruption. It is characterized by the following3:
(a) A dual conception of the Bpublic^ sphere: In Nigeria, the public/private distinc-
tion, which has helped in these past few centuries to order society in the West and
to clarify the notion of corruption, is either non-existent or is not helpful owing to
the dual conception of the Bpublic^ [96]. A sharp distinction between the public
and the private is necessary in any fight against corruption because the fight is
about preventing wielders of public power from privatizing public resources. An
important step in the anti-corruption struggle historically has been the unification
of both private and public moral standards, such that what is wrong in one’s
private judgment would also be wrong in terms of public morality. However, a
rather strange lack of private and public moral coincidence is plainly observable in
Nigeria. The modern Bpublic^ of the civil service, the army, the police, banks,
industries, and businesses, was a creation of the colonial administration. It exists
side by side with the primordial public of villages, tribes, clans of the vast rural
expanses of the country. While the primordial Bpublic^ is regarded mostly as
moral by the populace, the modern Bpublic^ is considered to exist in an amoral
sphere. Theft, extortion, and misappropriation of property may be considered
morally wrong in the primordial society, but the same wrongs are viewed with
indifference, or even encouraged, in the modern sector by the same society. The
colonial relationship with the rural sector was characterized by amoral behaviour –
extortion, theft, cheating, forcible seizure of property, human rights violation, etc.
[97, 98]. These traumatized and alienated the citizens and drove a wedge between
them and the face of modernity – the government. Evidence of a continuity of
mutual alienation is ubiquitous. Government hardly consults with the citizens on
important national initiatives, and citizens hardly identify with those initiatives
unless coerced to do so. Unfortunately, succeeding Nigerian leaders have left the
gulf created by the departing colonial authorities unrepaired. Several nation-
3 This part of the article draws extensively on views I articulated in two earlier works: Ocheje [94] and Ocheje
[95].
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building attempts have foundered on the altar of greed, abuse of power, and
continuing violation of human rights. As a result, the notion of Bpublic interest^
is very underdeveloped among Nigerians; there is no general notion of public
interest in the society, unless it is related to one’s ethnic group, or village or clan,
or extended family.
(b) A dual economy: The dual morality is complemented by a dual economy [99]. In
spite of the huge revenues from the sale of crude oil over these past decades, the
Nigerian economy remains Benclave^, some say Bdual^, in nature [100]. It
consists of a tiny export enclave which feeds on a larger rural periphery, paying
pittance for export crops. It creates poverty for a majority of the citizens while
concentrating wealth at the center for the merchants, the banks, the corporations,
corrupt civil servants, the police, and the army. The lack of economic diversifi-
cation has constricted opportunities for investment in independent and productive
economic activities rather than rent-seeking [101]. Thus, an embedded moral
economy of corruption has created a wide tolerance for illicit financial flows
among the populace [2, 61]. The failure to industrialize means that the economy is
condemned to generating raw materials with ever-fluctuating and vulnerable
prices, as opposed to the stable and ever-rising prices of manufactured products
in the international market. Poverty has deepened inequality and further alienated
a majority of citizens from the affairs of government [102–104].
(c) Weak institutions breeding a Brationality of fear^: Attempting to build a nation
from the top is fraught with uncertainties and, sometimes, human rights violations.
In Nigeria, such a task involves galvanizing disparate ethnic groups who have yet
to detach themselves from their traditional sources of security, intertwined as these
are with their totemic allegiances. For many, the modern state, imposed on these
groups by an accident of history, has yet to prove its merit in terms of providing a
rallying point for the actualization of a common destiny. Abuse of power and
impunity have remained an almost routine feature of governance [105, 106]. In the
civil service, for example, salaries are sometimes delayed or not paid [107, 108
when paid, salaries are too meagre to meet the needs of workers for food, fees for
children in school, or medical care; administrative mix-up or incompetence
sometimes leaves retirees without pensions or other benefits [109]. It is not
unknown for heads of government agencies to fraudulently keep workers’ salaries
in their private bank accounts in order to convert the interests such money might
yield, while claiming delay in the release of budget allocations by the responsible
authorities. In these circumstances, it is rational to fear for the future [110]. This
fear translates into a willingness to corner or squirrel away public resources by
individuals who have access to them in an attempt to secure the future for
themselves and their families.
The attitudinal dispositions which the above social, political, and economic institutions
have spawned and nurtured among citizens are often reflected in popular idioms of everyday
discourse of corruption and its understanding in Nigeria. A sample of the idioms are:
(a) A goat eats where it is tethered or where one works is where he Bchops^: this
idiom translates into a justification for peculation, especially from the modern
public sector, which is considered a moral Bno man’s land^. BEating^ or
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Bchopping^ – taking care of one’s needs and wants, even if dishonestly, from a
public source – where one works is not judged a wrong thing, no matter the nature
of the Bchopping^.
(b) A position in government is an opportunity to eat: This means that every
government appointee is expected to use the opportunity to enrich themselves,
and there is no opprobrium attached to such behavior.
(c) Government business is nobody’s business: No one deserves punishment for being
delinquent towards the government. This idiom justifies all kinds of delinquency
in public life, such as stealing, absenteeism, lateness to work, incompetence, and
so on.
(d) When there is a big tree, small ones climb on its back to reach the sun: this
justifies the expectation that a successful person has an obligation to help his/her
kinsmen by all means, even if rules have to be broken in the process.
(e) The Bnational cake^ must be shared: everyone has a stake in the national wealth,
i.e., wealth from the sale of crude oil and other public sources of revenue, but the
emphasis is on Bsharing^ the cake rather than Bbaking^ it. While it is generally
considered fair for everyone to feel entitled towards the state, there is no expec-
tation of a corresponding obligation on anyone to help build the nation.
(f) Those who take from government are wise; those who do not are fools: The
government is adept at amassing wealth without moral inhibitions; whoever is
smart enough to beat it at its own game is to be congratulated, not condemned.
(g) Government is an alien entity: In popular discourse, the government is often
typified as Bthey ,^ and the citizens as Bus^, two entities that exist in competition or
opposition, never in collaboration or co-operation. The demonization of govern-
ment sets the stage for its alienation from popular imagination.
(h) Eating but working is acceptable: If those who have access to the public purse
help themselves to it, they should use whatever remains to work for the people.
Then, they would have atoned for their misdeeds. But eating without working is
condemnable.
(i) It is not what you know but who you know: Merit has no place in modern public
service; only connections can secure a job, not academic accomplishment or
experience or talent or skill.
All of the above makes it difficult even to name corruption correctly in Nigeria [111,
112], much less obtain a moral consensus on it.
Assessing the prospects for a successful anti-corruption struggle in Nigeria
As described above, the environment of corruption in Nigeria, owing to a combination of
historical andmodern factors, is at worst conducive to, and, at best, tolerant of, corruption.
Section 15(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria obligates the state to
Babolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power .^ Successive governments since
independence, military or civilian, have instituted anti-corruption campaigns with remark-
able failure, such that corruption has festered and become entrenched in the country.
Corruption cleanups have failed because they consisted mainly of the legal approach
without much attention to the normative context of the problem. To successfully attack
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corruption in Nigeria requires that, first, a large degree of national consensus must be
forged about the danger of corruption to the corporate existence of the country. To obtain
such a consensus, in turn, requires renewed effort at nation building, to redirect ethnic or
totemic allegiances to the state, reinforcing the hegemony of the state and improving the
state-society relationship. Currently, the state-society relationship is fraught with mistrust
and suspicion. Secondly, the economymust be diversified and vastly improved in order to
create more economic opportunities and sustainable prosperity across the land. Thirdly,
there is a dire need for fairness and equity in the distribution of the country’s resources
among the citizens. The current structure is highly skewed against a majority of the
citizens. The overall objective must be to create a stake for every citizen in the continued
strength and prosperity of the state.
The Buhari government appears to have learnt a few lessons from the abject failure of
its predecessors. It has strengthened the legal tool for fighting corruption. Several tough
pieces of legislation have been proposed to be added to the already rich arsenal of laws
against corruption [113]. The government has subscribed to new international frame-
works for combating corruption, and sought, with modest success, to rejig its mutual
legal assistance schemes with many countries of the world. However, the government’s
use of the law is being complemented by other strategies. The government has embarked
on a large social investment program. A rudimentary social welfare scheme, involving
cash transfers to the poorest segment of the population, is part of the program [114]. A
school feeding program for children is also part of the program [115, 116]. Both of these
programs are a first in the history of the country. There is also the Government Enterprise
and Empowerment Program, which gives soft loans to traders, artisans, and others in the
category, and the N-Power program, which is directed at unemployed graduates of
tertiary institutions. These programs are aimed at gradually bridging the state-society
anomie by helping to create new social norms supportive of nationhood.
Admittedly, past governments had also engaged in similar kinds of social interven-
tion. Babangida’s government, through the office of the first lady, had instituted the
Better Life for Rural Women, and the Mass Mobilization for Self-Reliance, Social
Justice and Economic Recovery. Similarly, Obasanjo’s government created the Nation-
al Orientation Agency, which, together with the Ministry of Information, attempted to
inculcate the spirit of nationalism among Nigerians. It also created the National Poverty
Eradication Program. So did Goodluck Jonathan with the SURE-P, the Subsidy
Reinvestment and Empowerment Program. These programs only achieved negligible
outcomes, and some of them corruptly deviated from the standards of transparency
expected of them [117]. Perhaps the organic linking of the Buhari social investment
programs to the fight against corruption would achieve outcomes that are more
successful.
Overall, the government appears to be opening up a national conversation about
corruption, and it is currently attempting to tone down the public perception or
notoriety of government for high-handedness and human rights abuse. The country is
just now emerging from a deep recession, but the effort of the government to improve
the economy is evident from the programs it has instituted for diversification of the
economy and for a judicious use of national revenues [118].
In the end, time will tell if this expanded approach to the anti-corruption fight will be
a success story, but its correctness cannot be doubted, given the environment of
corruption in Nigeria.
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Concluding remarks
This article has attempted to describe Nigeria’s anti-corruption struggle within the
period 1999–2017. This period coincides with three consecutive experiments in de-
mocracy. Hitherto, there had been long periods of military intervention in the politics of
the country, in which talk about accountability was made nonsensical by the arbitrar-
iness of the military regimes. The new experiments in democracy present a propitious
lens for the assessment of effort by democratically elected governments to confront the
greatest impediment against the development of the country.
The article described the environment of corruption in Nigeria, pointing out the
central features of the environment that is constituted by the social norms, institutions,
and values of the citizens, which are, in turn, born of the colonial legacy and contem-
porary problems of nationhood. This environment mirrors a dissonance between legal
measures as a strategy for combating corruption and the value acceptances of the
country as enshrined in the social norms, values, and idioms of the citizens. It concludes
that, in spite of all odds, the current effort by the new government of Muhammadu
Buhari, because of its equal emphasis on nation building in addition to legal measures,
probably stands the best chance of successfully combating corruption in Nigeria.
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